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AUSTIN SARAT, LAWRENCE DOUGLAS AND MARTHA MERRILL UMPHREY 
(EDS), Law and the Utopian Imagination (The Amherst Series in Law, 
Jurisprudence and Social Thought). Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2014, pp. 185, ISBN 9780804790819, $75.00 (hbk). 
 
Described in its introductory chapter as ‘a project of exploration and 
resuscitation’ (p. 2) that ‘seek[s] to explore the possibilities of a productive 
engagement between the utopian and the legal imagination’ (ibid.), Law and the 
Utopian Imagination presents an edited collection in which a number of scholars 
consider the contribution utopianism may make to the analysis of law and legal 
theory.   
 
This is an engaging and original text, which would be of particular interest to 
advanced level undergraduate and postgraduate students, as well as established 
academics, with interests in legal theory and utopianism.  Its contribution, as the 
editors highlight, is situated in a contemporary context that eschews utopianism 
as both impossible and, potentially, dangerous.     Reflecting a commitment to the 
instantiation of a perfect society, utopia has, from a liberal perspective, been 
seen to ‘pave[] the way to totalitarianism’ (p. 1) from which the law is seen as 
necessary to provide protection.  Accordingly, utopia and liberalism have often 
been considered mutually incompatible: where utopianism has ‘typically 
displayed hostility toward legal forms and processes’ (p. 4) – notwithstanding 
those utopias that recognise a role of law in maintaining harmony in the ideal 
society they propose – from a liberal standpoint, law is considered ‘a necessary 
bulwark against the inevitable excesses of utopia’ (p. 6).  The consequence of this 
has been the rejection and neglect of utopian thought within legal theory. 
 
Against this backdrop, Law and the Utopian Imagination presents an attempt to 
reinject utopian thought into legal theory and to challenge the seeming 
intractability between utopianism and liberalism.  Formed of a collection of 
essays by different authors, a central theme that can be traced throughout the 
various contributions lies in an attempt to negotiate this tension through an 
exploration of the relationships (both actual and potential) between utopia and 
the law.  This is done in various ways throughout the different contributions to 
the collection and it is perhaps in this variety that utopianism’s potential 
contribution to legal theory is most effectively articulated.  
 
Specifically, having set the context in which the collection is situated in chapter 1, 
each of the subsequent chapters sees its respective author grapple with the 
question of what is the relationship between law and utopia and offer a 
reimagining of this relationship that challenges the apparent contradictions 
outlined in the first chapter. 
 
In Chapter 2, James Martel suggests, through his analysis of the work of Walter 
Benjamin, that ‘[t]he value […] of connecting legal to utopian thought comes from 
the way that both can serve as ways to rethink our contemporary practices by 
mutually calling the assumptions that we make about these practices into 
question’ (p. 23).  Specifically, for Martel, ‘[u]topianism […] serves as a powerful 
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tool by which to do something that is otherwise difficult or even impossible: to 
rethink the nature of law’ (p. 55.). 
 
For Johan Van Der Walt, on the other hand, legal theory and utopianism are best 
understood as alternative responses ‘that emerge from and respond to a 
primordial event or happening’ (p. 63).  Drawing upon the Heideggerian notion 
of the ‘event’ – a rupture to existing social worlds which also entails the creation 
of new ones – Van Der Walt argues that utopia offers an opportunity to unmake 
and remake the world in new ways, but always and only every with reference to 
the event from which it is derived.  In this respect utopias seem almost like the 
embodiment (albeit always mediated through language) of the event: at once 
both offering up new possibilities and horizons of the unknown, but only ever 
able to do so through systems of language that already exist.  By contrast, he 
argues, law seeks to move beyond the event and remove the ambiguity it 
necessarily invokes. By asserting itself and seeking legitimacy, law seeks to 
‘distance’ itself from the event and impose a normative order, in so doing, 
suppressing and denying its fictive nature.  In this sense, Van Der Walt taps into 
the ambiguity or tension between law and utopia identified in the introduction 
to the collection: utopianism embraces the event as a moment to open up the 
horizons of reality and challenge our normative assumptions, law works to offer 
order in the face of upheaval.   
 
Offering an alternative view is Nan Goodman whose contribution highlights 
‘[t]he reciprocity that exists between the law and utopia’ (p. 101).  Whilst the 
role of utopia in shaping the law is well-recognised, Goodman focuses on the 
somewhat less-explored role of law in shaping utopian alternatives.  Using 
Cotton Mather’s (1961) sermon Things to be Look’d For as a case study, Goodman 
challenges the idea that utopia can only exist in a perfect society with the 
eradication ‘of all difference and the annihilation of all enemies’ (p. 16) instead, 
highlighting a vision of ‘peace as a cessation of war negotiated through the legal 
instrument of treaty and managed through diplomacy’ (ibid.). 
 
A similar approach is evident in Diane Morgan’s paper, which comprises an 
interesting analysis of Kant’s contribution to utopian thinking.  Morgan identifies 
in Kant a defence of utopianism, not in terms of the imposition of a blueprint, but 
in the potential of ‘the republican “dream of perfection”’ (p. 127) as an essential 
component of politics in order that it ‘does not foreclose possible change as a 
result of preconceived notions of what is, and what is not, possible.’ (ibid.).  
Cognisant of capacity for impositions of utopia to turn into nightmarish realities 
and sympathetic, therefore, to a contemporary shift within utopian theory ‘away 
from the “blueprint” model of legislation as a means of implementing social 
progress’ (p, 130), Morgan seeks ‘to explore “cosmopolitan” law as a different 
form of justice, more evolutive and explorative than other forms of legislation’ 
(ibid.).     
 
In the final chapter, Shulamit Almog highlights ‘an innate kinship between many 
legal and utopian expressions’ (p. 155).  Through her analysis of two dystopian 
films: Jean-Luc Goddard’s (1965) Alphaville and Ridley Scott’s (1982) Blade 
Runner, Almog demonstrates the role of law in both creating dystopia – through 
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‘excessive and abusive use of law’ (p. 171) and acting as a safeguard against it.  In 
so doing, she challenges the contemporary liberal standpoint identified in the 
opening chapter that juxtaposes utopian and legal thinking: where the former 
leads by necessity to the realisation of dystopia and the job of the latter is to 
safeguard against this.  Instead, she highlights the extent to which both 
utopianism and legal thinking are necessarily intertwined, or, as she puts it, ‘how 
dystopian imagination augments the legal imagination’ (p. 172).  In so doing, 
Almog perhaps sounds an implicit note of caution against those who would see 
legal thinking and utopia as mutually and necessarily incompatible, lest they fail 
to recognise the implicit dystopia that can be contained within a commitment to 
legal thinking absenting an interrogation ‘of independent values or stable moral 
codes’ (p. 172). 
 
This variety of approaches to this tension between utopianism and law is 
perhaps the collection’s greatest strength.  It seems that individual chapter 
authors have been given relative free reign in their interpretation of the concept 
of ‘utopia’, and/or the application of utopian theory to the field of legal theory.  
Such freedom allows for a range of views and accounts of legal theory, some of 
which are more or less accessible to those familiar with legal theory than utopian 
studies (and vice versa).  There is a strong sense in which this publication 
genuinely seeks to marry together fields of study, which, as the editors highlight 
in their opening chapter, have long been kept distinct.  It also operates to 
demonstrate, in practice, the ambiguity that is inherent to the concept of utopia 
(as simultaneously both ‘good place’ and ‘no place’) and the variety of uses to 
which the term has historically been put. 
 
At the same time, however, at times one wonders whether this was deliberate or 
more accidental.  There is, perhaps, a danger that readers can be left questioning 
how, exactly, each author is employing the term ‘utopia’ and whether, in fact, 
they are all talking about the same thing.  As noted above, this has the potential 
to be a real strength of the collection, pointing to the various ways in which 
utopianism may or may not intersect with legal theory.  However, one cannot 
help but wonder, whether, if it is deliberate the collection might not also have 
benefitted from a stronger editorial narrative tying the respective contributions 
together in a final, concluding chapter to make this important contribution 
clearer and more explicit. 
 
Moreover, and still with this in mind, one equally wonders if more direct and 
more explicit engagement with the literature of utopian theory (and, in 
particular, definitions of utopia) could have lent clarity and helped to improve 
the accessibility of the ideas and arguments made, particularly to those readers 
who do not engage with this text from the perspective of legal theory (in which 
category I include myself).  Whilst this was done well in some chapters 
(especially that of Almog which draws on some well-known texts to students of 
utopian studies, including J.C. Davis, Lyman Tower Sargent, Ruth Levitas, and 
Tom Moylan and Raffaella Baccolini, and the editor’s introduction), others 
appeared to be written more with a legal theory audience in mind.  There is 
nothing wrong with this per se and, admittedly, it could, perhaps, simply be that I 
am reviewing a text for whom I am not the intended audience.  However, it also, 
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potentially, gives rise to the question of whether this book is best understood of 
an exercise in using law to explore the utopian imagination or using a utopian 
imagination to explore the law.   
 
The case for the need to explore utopianism in relation to law is made clearly 
and convincingly in the editor’s introduction and the book produced is both an 
interesting and engaging contribution to that field.  However, perhaps reflecting 
the difficulties of disciplinarity (and perhaps, implicitly pointing to the capacity 
of utopian theory and literature to offer an appeal beyond disciplinary 
boundaries), in making the case for the importance of their text, one wonders if 
more recognition by the editors might also be given to aligned areas in which 
interest in utopianism has been growing in recent years, such as criminology 
(see, for example, Malloch and Munro (2013)).  Not only would this help provide 
a richer understanding of the ways in which the concept of ‘utopia’ and utopian 
theory has been deployed as an antidote to the anti-utopianism of previous 
decades, it would also help situate this text as part of a broader shift in 
contemporary social theory and research whilst not disputing the original 
contribution it makes in its particular focus on legal theory. 
 
This would necessarily be a trade-off between appealing to a specialist legal 
theory audience and a more general readership and it is a strength of the 
collection that there is, in a sense, something for everyone: both legal theorists 
and scholars of utopia alike.  However, as a means of inviting legal theorists into 
a consideration of utopia, this seems a timely, necessary and genuinely 
interesting collection of papers.  As a means of inviting scholars of utopia into the 
world of legal theory (which is the perspective to which I confess to belong) it is, 
perhaps, less satisfying – not because the ideas are not interesting or relevant or 
important, but because disciplinary assumptions sometimes shape the ideas 
presented making them less accessible to the uninitiated reader.  That said, in 
any case, it is perhaps as an exercise in exploring the various definitions of 
utopia or applications of the utopian theory, that, for this reader at least, this text 
finds its greatest appeal. 
 
Lynne Copson,  
The Open University, UK 
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